Bava Kamma 87

שור באדם שעשה בו קטנים כגדולים אינו דין שחייב על הקטנים כגדולים

now in the case of Cattle killing man where the law made small cattle [liable] as [it did make] big cattle,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Cf. infra p. 380, and 'Ed. VI, 1. ');">¹</span>

לא אם אמרת אדם באדם שכן חייב בארבעה דברים תאמר בשור שאינו חייב בד' דברים ת"ל (שמות כא, לא) או בן יגח או בת יגח לחייב על הקטנים כגדולים

should it not stand to reason that there is liability for little ones as there is for grown-ups?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Why then was it necessary for Scripture to make this explicit in Ex. XXI, 31? ');">²</span>

ואין לי אלא במועדין בתם מנין

— No, [for it could have been argued that] if you stated this ruling in the case of Man killing man it was [perhaps] because [where Man injured man] there was liability for the four [additional] items,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For which cf. supra p. 12. ');">³</span>

דין הוא הואיל וחייב באיש ואשה וחייב בבן ובת מה כשחייב באיש ואשה לא חלקת בו בין תם למועד אף כשחייב בבן ובת לא תחלוק בו בין תם למועד

but how would you be able to prove the same ruling in the case of Cattle where there could be no liability for the four [additional] items? Hence it is further laid down: Whether it have gored a son or have gored a daughter to impose liability for little ones as for grown-ups. So far I know this only in the case of <i>Mu'ad</i>.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As verse 31 follows 29 and 30 which deal with Mu'ad. ');">⁴</span>

ועוד קל וחומר מה איש ואשה שכן הורע כחם בנזקין לא חלקת בו בין תם למועד בן ובת שיפה כחם בנזקין אינו דין שלא תחלוק בהן בין תם למועד

Whence do I know it in the case of <i>Tam</i>? — We infer it by analogy: Since there is liability for killing Man or Woman and there is similarly liability for killing Son or Daughter, just as regarding the liability for Man or Woman you made no discrimination between <i>Tam</i> and <i>Mu'ad</i>,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As clearly seen in verses 29 and 30. ');">⁵</span>

אמרת וכי דנין קל מחמור להחמיר (עליו אם החמיר במועד החמור תחמיר בתם הקל

so also regarding the liability for Son or Daughter you should make no discrimination between <i>Tam</i> and <i>Mu'ad</i>. Moreover there is an <i>a fortiori</i> argument [to the same effect]; for if in the case of Man and Woman who are in a disadvantageous position when damages had been done by them,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e. they are liable to pay for it. Cf. supra p. 63 but also infra p. 502. ');">⁶</span>

ועוד) אם אמרת באיש ואשה שכן חייבין במצות תאמר בבן ובת שפטורין מן המצות

you have nevertheless made there no discrimination between <i>Tam</i> and <i>Mu'ad</i>, in the case of Son and Daughter who are in an advantageous position when damage has Been done by them,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For which they are not liable to pay; see infra p. 502. ');">⁷</span>

ת"ל או בן יגח או בת יגח נגיחה בתם נגיחה במועד נגיחה למיתה נגיחה לנזקין

should it not stand to reason that you should make no discrimination between <i>Tam</i> and <i>Mu'ad</i>? — [No,] you cannot argue thus. Can we draw an analogy from a more serious to a lighter case so as to be more severe [with regard to the latter]? If<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [Some texts omit, 'If&nbsp;… Moreover,' v. D.S. a.l.] ');">⁸</span>

<big><strong>מתני׳</strong></big> שור שהיה מתחכך בכותל ונפל על האדם נתכוין להרוג את הבהמה והרג את האדם לכנעני והרג בן ישראל לנפלים והרג בן קיימא פטור

the law is strict with <i>Mu'ad</i> which is a more serious case, how can you argue that it ought to be [equally] strict with <i>Tam</i> which is a lighter case? Moreover, [you could also argue that] the case of Man and Woman [is graver] since they are under obligation to observe the commandments [of the Law],<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Cf. however, supra p. 64, but also Kid. I, 7. ');">⁹</span>

<big><strong>גמ׳</strong></big> אמר שמואל פטור ממיתה וחייב בכופר ורב אמר פטור מזה ומזה

but how draw therefrom an analogy to the case of Son and Daughter seeing that they are exempt from the commandments?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' So long as they are minors and have not reached puberty for which cf. Nid. 52a. ');">¹⁰</span>

ואמאי הא תם הוא כדאמר רב במועד ליפול על בני אדם בבורות הכא נמי במועד להתחכך על בני אדם בכתלים

It was therefore necessary to state [further]: Whether it have gored a son, or have gored a daughter; [the repetition of the word 'gored' indicating that no discrimination should be made between] goring in the case of <i>Tam</i> and goring in the case of <i>Mu'ad</i>, between goring in the case of killing and goring in the case of mere injury.

אי הכי בר קטלא הוא בשלמא התם דחזא ירוקא ונפל אלא הכא מאי איכא למימר

<b><i>MISHNAH</i></b>. IF AN OX BY RUBBING ITSELF AGAINST A WALL CAUSED IT TO FALL UPON A PERSON [AND KILL HIM], OR IF AN OX WHILE TRYING TO KILL A BEAST [BY ACCIDENT] KILLED A HUMAN BEING, OR WHILE AIMING AT A HEATHEN<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Cf. supra p. 211, n. 6. ');">¹¹</span>

הכא נמי במתחכך בכותל להנאתו ומנא ידעינן דבתר דנפל קא מתחכך ביה

KILLED AN ISRAELITE, OR WHILE AIMING AT NON-VIABLE INFANTS KILLED A VIABLE CHILD, THERE IS NO LIABILITY. <b><i>GEMARA</i></b>. Samuel said: There is exemption [for the ox in these cases] only from [the penalty of being stoned to] death, but there is lability [for the owner] to pay <i>kofer</i>.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As also maintained by R. Johanan, supra p. 248, and still earlier by R. Eliezer, supra p. 237. ');">¹²</span> Rab, however, said: There is exemption here from both liabilities.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For the reason v. supra 244 ');">¹³</span> But why [<i>kofer</i>]?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In the case dealt with first in the Mishnah. ');">¹⁴</span> Was not the ox <i>Tam</i>?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In killing a human being by rubbing itself against a wall and thus causing it to fall. In the case of Tam no kofer is paid; see Ex. XXI, 28. ');">¹⁵</span> — Just as [in an analogous case] Rab said that the ox was <i>Mu'ad</i> to fall upon human beings in pits,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Infra p. 274. ');">¹⁶</span> so also [in this case we say that] the ox was <i>Mu'ad</i> to rub itself against walls [which thus fell] upon human beings. But if so, why should the ox not be liable to [be stoned to] death? It is correct in this other case where we can explain that the ox was looking at some vegetables and so came to fall [into a pit],<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And as intention to kill was lacking, no death penalty could be attached. ');">¹⁷</span> but here what ground could we give [for assuming otherwise than an intention to kill on the part of the ox]? — Here also [we may suppose that] the ox had been rubbing itself against the wall for its own gratification.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And as intention to kill was lacking, no death penalty could be attached. ');">¹⁷</span> But how can we know this?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Seeing that the ox was Mu'ad to rub itself against walls. ');">¹⁸</span> — [By noticing that] even after the wall had fallen the ox was still rubbing itself against it.